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Chapter 1
Employers’ Perspectives 
on Delayed Retirement
Many policy analysts, economists, and demographers have argued 
that individuals must extend their work lives if they are to achieve 
their desired standard of living in retirement. Increases in longevity 
imply that individuals who leave the labor force at traditional retire-
ment ages must either save more during their working careers or 
consume less during their retirement. Reductions in the generosity of 
employer- and government-funded retirement programs exacerbate 
this problem. Thus, workers today must save more than their prede-
cessors to achieve the same level of retirement well-being. The idea 
seems clear—working longer and retiring later is the only way future 
retirees can sufficiently finance their retirement. 
Later retirement can be achieved by remaining in one’s career job 
until an older age. Alternatively, individuals can retire but not imme-
diately leave the labor force. Instead, they can begin a retirement tran-
sition that includes moving through different types of employment; 
for example, an employer could offer shorter hours or a less stressful 
working environment.
Despite the logic that working longer is needed to support more 
years in retirement, relatively few studies have directly addressed 
employer interests and the constraints that might lead companies and 
organizations to resist delayed retirement from career jobs. This book 
seeks to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive assessment of the 
costs and benefits to employers of accommodating later retirement 
ages. Employers that oppose later retirements could adopt employ-
ment and compensation policies to impede or limit workers’ opportu-
nities to remain on the job. 
Economic theory based on profit maximization indicates that 
companies must determine the optimal number of workers to hire and 
also the appropriate age and skill composition of their workforces. The 
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firm will need a mix of employees with different skill sets and skill 
levels and who have different vintages of human capital. To maxi-
mize profits, companies need the right number and the optimal mix of 
workers. Changes in the age structure of a company’s workforce due 
to delayed retirement can affect labor costs, productivity, profitability, 
and sustainability. In the following chapters, we argue that companies 
develop their compensation policies in order to attract, retain, moti-
vate, and ultimately retire their desired workforces.
Increased life expectancy and associated modifications to public 
and private retirement-related policies will lead workers to alter their 
career paths. Desired increases in the duration of work life can come 
in several forms as workers experience new pathways from full-time 
work to complete retirement. That transition has become an important 
phase of work life. Indeed, how this transition is made, and whether it 
is done successfully, will affect an individual’s well-being throughout 
retirement. 
Changes in government policy that increase eligibility ages for 
retirement benefits, coupled with increased life expectancy and the 
continuing evolution of employer retirement programs, will lead 
many workers to try to extend their work lives by delaying the onset 
of complete retirement. With the exception of the economic down-
turn during 2007–2009, labor force participation rates of persons 
65 and older have been steadily climbing since the mid-1980s. One 
method of extending work life is to delay the start of the transition to 
retirement and simply work longer at the current job. Alternatively, 
workers could prolong the transition period from full-time work to 
full retirement by including intermediate work-related steps, such as 
phased retirement, bridge jobs, or self-employment.1
Whether workers delay the start of the transition, increase the 
time spent in transition, or increasingly take alternative paths from 
career job to retirement, employers must consider the advantages and 
costs of retaining or hiring older workers. The expanding potential 
labor pool of older workers, particularly among those with relatively 
high stocks of human capital, could provide an unexpected bonus to 
employers through greater returns on their investment in long-term 
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employees. However, older workers often are relatively highly com-
pensated, and some will experience diminished productivity at older 
ages. Furthermore, as employers retain older workers, younger work-
ers’ opportunities for advancement might be restricted. 
Employers must address the changing demographics in their 
workforces. By creating compensation and employment policies to 
accommodate prolonged or delayed retirement transitions, they will 
be better positioned to reap the benefits of employing older workers. 
This book examines the employer perspective on how to respond 
to the needs and desires of older workers to delay or prolong the tran-
sition from full-time employment to complete retirement. What fac-
tors influence the willingness of firms to retain older workers? Can 
firms develop transitional employment contracts so workers can shift 
to new areas, perhaps with less responsibility and lower compensa-
tion, while remaining with their career employers? While exploring 
the bottlenecks and constraints that might inhibit the development 
of delayed retirement policies, this book provides new insights into 
how retirement transitions might proceed in the coming years and the 
potential implications and effectiveness of government and employer 
policies regarding retirement ages. 
EMPLOYEE PREFERENCES FOR LATER RETIREMENT
Retirement decisions are influenced by economic and demo-
graphic factors, including real income, personal savings, health 
and family issues, job opportunities, and retirement plans, such as 
employer pensions and Social Security. As these determinants have 
changed over time, so has the average age of retirement. For most 
of the twentieth century, the labor force participation rate of older 
persons declined in response to rising real incomes, improving health, 
changes in the physical demands of many jobs, the introduction of 
defined benefit pension plans, and the establishment and liberaliza-
tion of Social Security and Medicare. Earlier retirement coupled with 
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increasing life expectancy placed a premium on planning and saving 
for retirement.
In the mid-1980s, the proportion of older persons who remained 
in the labor force began to increase. This reversal of a long-term 
trend toward earlier retirement began as employers switched from 
defined benefit to defined contribution plans, which have very differ-
ent retirement incentives. In addition, changes to Social Security also 
encouraged later retirement.2 Finally, the continued increase in life 
expectancy at older ages made financing a longer period of retirement 
increasingly difficult. All these factors have encouraged older work-
ers to remain in the labor force and delay retirement.
For most of the twentieth century, increasing life expectancy 
coincided with a decline in the age at which most people permanently 
left the labor force. Rising real income, along with the development 
of employer pensions and national retirement programs, made retire-
ment possible for millions of American workers; it became an impor-
tant phase in life. Workers planned for retirement and made saving 
and consumption decisions in order to achieve their desired standard 
of living during their final years. 
Increase in Life Expectancy and the Need for Working Longer 
The number of years of expected retirement is determined by the 
age of retirement and the life expectancy at the retirement age. For 
example, if a worker enters the labor force at age 20, expects to retire 
at age 65, and has a life expectancy at age 65 of 15 years, the indi-
vidual has 45 years of work to accumulate the resources to finance 15 
years of retirement. However, if the expected retirement age fell to 
60 and life expectancy at age 60 increased to age 85, the individual 
would have 40 years of work to save for 25 years in retirement. Of 
course, these changes would require a much higher annual saving 
rate in order to finance the same standard of living in retirement. In 
contrast, delaying retirement increases work and saving years while 
decreasing the number of retirement years that need to be supported. 
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Next we consider some actual changes in life expectancy and their 
impact on retirement decisions.
As shown in Table 1.1, male life expectancy at age 65 increased 
by 3.9 years between 1980 and 2014—from 14.1 years to 18.0 years. 
Females continue to have more years of expected life remaining at 
age 65; however, the gender difference in life expectancy declined 
from 4.2 years in 1980 to 2.5 years in 2014. Holding the age of retire-
ment constant with rising life expectancy means more years in retire-
ment. Thus, in order to finance the same level of annual consumption 
in retirement with the longer life expectancy, workers must save more 
while working.
To illustrate the magnitude of the need for additional saving, let us 
consider a male worker retiring at age 65 with 14 years of remaining 
life who has saved $250,000 to help finance his retirement. Assume 
that he purchases a life annuity that provides a fixed income per year 
until death. With an assumed life expectancy of 14 years and using a 3 
percent interest rate, column 1 in Table 1.2 shows that he could antici-
pate annual income of $22,132. Now consider a similar retiree with 
18 years of expected life remaining. Based on the additional years 
of payouts, the same $250,000 account balance would provide only 
$18,177 per year of income. Table 1.2 also shows how the annual 
Men Women
Year Birth 65 Birth 65
1970 67.1 13.1 74.7 17.0
1980 70.0 14.1 77.4 18.3
1990 71.8 15.1 78.8 18.9
1995 72.5 15.6 78.9 18.9
2000 74.1 16.0 79.3 19.0
2005 75.0 16.9 80.1 19.6
2010 76.2 17.7 81.0 20.3
2014 76.4 18.0 81.2 20.5
SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics (2015). 
Table 1.1  Life Expectancy at Birth and Age 65, by Gender
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payout will continue to decline to only $16,804 if life expectancy at 
age 65 rises to 20 years. 
Column 2 in Table 1.2 demonstrates the impact of rising life 
expectancy in a slightly different manner. Assume that the individ-
ual wishes to have sufficient resources to have an annual income of 
$25,000 from her retirement savings. With a life expectancy of 14 
years, the worker would need to have saved $282,402 in order to have 
income of $25,000 per year; however, if the number of expected retire-
ment years rises to 18, the worker must have an account balance of 
$343,838.3 These examples show that, holding constant the retirement 
age, rising life expectancy requires either greater saving to achieve a 
desired annual income or for the worker to accept a lower standard 
of living in retirement if lifetime saving is unchanged. Alternatively, 
individuals could choose to work longer and delay retirement, thus 
offsetting the longevity gains by more years of work. Working longer 
may be the optimal response to longevity gains for many individuals, 
and how this preference for delayed retirement affects firms is the 
central focus of this book.
Table 1.2  Impact of Longevity Gains on Retirement Income ($)
Years of remaining life
(1)
Account balance 
of $250,000 provides 
annual payout of
(2)
Account balance 
needed to yield annual 
distribution of $25,000
14 22,132 282,402
15 20,942 298,448
16 19,903 314,028
17 18,988 329,153
18 18,177 343,838
19 17,453 358,095
20 16,804 371,937
NOTE: Values are determined using a 3 percent interest or discount rate, with annual 
payments occurring at the end of each year. The values shown in column (1) indicate 
the annual payout from an account balance of $250,000 for the indicated number of 
years. The values shown in column (2) indicate the account balance needed to pro-
vide an annual payout of $25,000 throughout retirement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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The challenge is that workers must save more and consume less 
while working or be satisfied with lower income and hence consump-
tion in retirement. An alternative to these choices is to work longer 
and delay retirement. Working longer means the individual has more 
years of earnings and saving. It also allows additional years of com-
pounding returns on retirement saving. Later retirement also implies 
fewer years in retirement over which these funds will be drawn down.
Employee	Benefits	and	Retirement	Incentives
Employers are moving away from defined benefit pension plans 
in favor of defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. Defined 
benefit plans promise retirees a monthly benefit for life; therefore, 
increases in life expectancy increase the present value of retirement 
benefits and, of course, increase the cost to the employer.4 While the 
real value of pension benefits will decline with inflation, the nominal 
monthly benefit will continue at the same rate throughout the lon-
ger retirement period. Thus, retirees with a defined benefit pension 
are exposed to inflation risk if cost of living adjustments do not ade-
quately increase the real value of the benefit. 
Pension plan participants who have reached the normal retire-
ment age must decide whether they want to retire and start their ben-
efits or work an additional year. The extra year of work will increase 
subsequent pension benefits, but the individual typically will not 
receive benefits during this time. Thus, the worker can compare the 
gain of marginally higher future benefits for the remainder of life to 
the loss of the current year’s benefit. Increases in life expectancy will 
have a rather small effect on the employee’s calculation of optimal 
retirement age.
In contrast, workers covered by a 401(k) plan must decide how 
to use the account balance in their retirement plans. Assume that this 
balance is used to purchase a life annuity. Holding constant the retire-
ment age and the account balance, increases in life expectancy will 
reduce the annual payout from the annuity. The 401(k) participant 
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can consider the possibility of working an additional year and thus 
postpone the purchase of the annuity. The individual is not giving 
up a year of benefits by postponing retirement but instead is simply 
able to purchase a larger annuity the following year. By working an 
extra year, not only does the account balance grow but the number 
of years in retirement is also reduced, so the payout from the annuity 
will rise. In general, increases in life expectancy for participants in 
defined contribution plans are likely to provide a greater incentive for 
individuals to remain in the labor force. 
This discussion illustrates how the change from defined benefit 
plans to defined contribution plans has altered retirement incentives 
and encouraged individuals to remain on the job. Over the past 75 
years, changes in employer compensation and employment policies 
first contributed to the decline in the average age of retirement and 
then provided additional incentives for individuals to want to remain 
on the job until older ages. 
Social Security Reforms and the Value of Delayed Claiming 
of	Benefits
Most American workers are covered by Social Security, and 
many retirees receive a significant portion of their household income 
from Social Security.5 An important determinant of the annual benefit 
is the age at which benefits are begun or the claiming age for Social 
Security. Over the years, the age for “full benefits” and the value of 
delaying claiming have increased. For individuals born between 1943 
and 1954, current rules state that the age for full retirement benefits is 
66.6 At this age, individuals claiming benefits will receive 100 percent 
of their primary insurance amount (PIA).7 Alternatively, workers can 
claim “early” benefits at age 62. However, when individuals claim 
benefits prior to age 66, their monthly benefits are reduced by five-
ninths of 1 percent per month for the first 36 months and five-twelfths 
of 1 percent for each additional month. Delaying claiming benefits 
until after age 66 increases benefits by 8 percent per year up to age 
70. To illustrate the impact of these rules, assume that if benefits are 
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begun at the full retirement age of 66, the monthly benefit will be 
$1,000. If benefits are claimed at 62, the earliest age of eligibility, the 
monthly benefit is only $750, or a 25 percent reduction in monthly 
benefits for the rest of one’s life. Despite these penalties for early 
claiming, almost half of all individuals claim benefits at age 62.8 
There is also a delayed retirement credit of 8 percent per year for 
individuals who postpone claiming benefits until age 70. If a claimant 
who expects a benefit of $1,000 at age 66 postponed claiming benefits 
until age 70, the monthly benefit would increase to $1,320 per month. 
When claiming benefits at age 70 compared to 62, the monthly ben-
efit is 76 percent greater.9 On average, the present value of benefits 
is approximately the same regardless of when the benefits are started 
(Social Security Trustees 2014). However, one should note the sub-
stantial difference in monthly benefits based on the age at which a 
person claims benefits.  
Recent studies have argued that, under current law, the expected 
present value of lifetime Social Security benefits rises as claiming is 
postponed for each month after the individual reaches age 62. Shoven 
and Slavov (2014a,b) illustrate that, for most households, delay-
ing the start of Social Security benefits results in a higher lifetime 
present value of these benefits. They also point out that the gain in 
lifetime benefits with delayed claiming has been increasing because 
of changes in Social Security rules (e.g., an increase in the delayed 
retirement credit after the full retirement age), lower real interest 
rates, and increases in life expectancy for individuals in their sixties. 
Shoven and Slavov (2013, p. 1) state, “With today’s life expectancies 
and today’s extremely low interest rates, it is in almost everyone’s 
interest to delay the commencement of Social Security. For many 
people, delaying to 70 is the value maximizing strategy.”10
The age at which an individual claims her Social Security benefits 
has a major impact on her annual income in retirement. While claim-
ing benefits does not require one to stop working, many individuals 
would find it difficult to leave the labor force and not claim Social 
Security benefits. Clearly, changes in age-related rules governing 
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benefits have increased incentives for individuals to continue work-
ing and delay claiming benefits. Increases in life expectancy holding 
the age rules constant only strengthen the incentive to delay claiming. 
When developing and modifying their own retirement policies in an 
effort to achieve the desired workforce, employers must consider the 
impact of policy reforms and their effect on worker behavior.
Working Longer Because of Health Concerns, the Cost of 
Health Insurance, and the Decline in Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance in Retirement
An important component of a secure retirement is access to 
affordable health care. As individuals age, they face an increased risk 
of having a costly adverse health event. They must accumulate suffi-
cient wealth to be prepared for the possibility of extensive and expen-
sive medical treatment. Medicare provides basic coverage for most 
individuals aged 65 and older but does not cover expenses for chronic 
conditions and treatments, including long-term care. Individuals who 
are poor or disabled may qualify for Medicaid as a secondary payer. 
Some research has considered why individuals do not purchase long-
term-care insurance at higher rates and whether Medicaid crowds out 
private long-term-care insurance (e.g., Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein 
2007). 
Workers without access to health insurance in retirement might 
postpone retiring until they are eligible for Medicare (e.g., Mermin, 
Johnson, and Murphy 2007). Conversely, recent research has docu-
mented a strong link between employer-provided retiree health insur-
ance and earlier retirement ages (e.g., Fitzpatrick 2014; Robinson and 
Clark 2010; Shoven and Slavov 2014c). 
Access to health insurance can alter retirement timing, and 
employer-provided retiree health insurance may be an important 
aspect of retirement transitions. While providing retiree health insur-
ance may be an effective strategy for employers to encourage earlier 
retirements, it is a costly benefit that is rapidly disappearing. The Kaiser 
Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational Trust 
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(2015) report that only 23 percent of firms with 200 or more workers 
that offer health benefits to their active employees extend this cover-
age to retirees—down from 66 percent in 1988. The rising cost of 
health care at older ages, along with the decline in employer-provided 
retiree health insurance, has made early retirement costlier and influ-
enced workers to delay leaving their career jobs. If the promise of 
health insurance in retirement encourages workers to retire before age 
65, then employer decisions to eliminate this benefit may provide an 
incentive for workers to remain on the job. This analysis highlights a 
dilemma that confronts employers—the need to control the costs of 
health care associated with early retirement without adversely affect-
ing the desired retirement ages of their workers.  
The Increasing Labor Force Participation of Older Persons 
Through most of the twentieth century, the average age of retire-
ment declined despite increases in life expectancy.11 This reduction in 
labor force participation among older persons has been attributed to 
rising per capita income (Costa 1998), the enactment of Social Secu-
rity, and the spread of employer pensions (Quinn, Burkhauser, and 
Myers 1990). The labor force participation rates of men 65 and older 
fell from about 46 percent in 1950 to about 16 percent by the mid-
1980s (Toosi 2002). However, during the past two decades this trend 
has reversed, and the proportion of the older population in the labor 
force has increased. 
Between 1994 and 2014, there have been substantial changes in 
the proportion of older men in the labor force. Table 1.3 illustrates 
the increase in the labor force participation rates of older men and 
women. The largest changes for men have been for individuals aged 
62 and older. The rate for men aged 62–64 increased from 45.1 per-
cent to 56.2 percent during this period, while the rate for men aged 
65–69 rose from 26.8 percent to 36.1 percent. Even the rates for men 
aged 70–74 increased substantially, from 15.8 to 22.8 percent. Par-
ticipation rates for women followed a similar pattern; however, the 
increases were greater for younger women. The proportion of women 
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Men Women  
Age 1994 2004 2014 2024 1994 2004 2014 2024
55–59 76.9 77.6 76.8 76.3 59.2 65.0 66.4 72.2
60–61 64.8 64.9 69.7 69.7 45.3 54.0 57.6 64.8
62–64 45.1 50.8 56.2 59.9 33.1 38.7 44.7 47.1
65–69 26.8 32.6 36.1 40.0 17.9 23.3 27.5 32.8
70–74 15.8 19.4 22.8 26.6 8.7 12.0 15.6 18.5
75 and older 8.6 9.0 11.0 13.5 3.5 4.3 5.9 8.4
SOURCE: Toosi (2015).  
Table 1.3  Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged 
55 and Older (%)
aged 55–59 who were in the labor force rose from 59.2 to 66.4 per-
cent, and the rate for women aged 60–61 increased from 45.3 to 57.6 
percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the labor force 
participation rates for men 62 and older will continue to increase 
through 2024, while that of women aged 55 and older also is expected 
to increase over the next decade (Toosi 2015).
The aging of the population and these increases in labor force 
participation rates have resulted in a more than doubling of the num-
ber of workers aged 55 and older, from 15.5 million in 1994 to 33.9 
million in 2014. Toosi (2015) reports that the proportion of the labor 
force aged 55 and over rose from 11.9 percent in 1994 to 21.7 per-
cent in 2014. The growth in the relative size of the older labor force 
raised the median age of the labor force from 37.7 years in 1994 to 
41.9 years in 2014. The rising share of the labor force composed of 
those 55 and older was driven by both the aging of the population and 
delayed retirement.12 These trends in the aging of the labor force are 
expected to continue over the next decade.
Another indicator of changing retirement patterns is responses 
to survey questions concerning retirement expectations. Since 1991, 
Gallup has been asking workers at what age they expect to retire and 
retirees the age at which they retired. Reviewing their surveys through 
2014, Gallup concludes that the self-reported age of retirement has 
moved “slowly upward.” According to Riffkin (2014), “Gallup con-
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ducted several polls in the early 1990s and found that the average 
retirement age was 57 in both 1991 and 1993. From 2002 through 
2012, the average hovered around 60. Over the past two years, the 
average age at which Americans report retiring has increased to 62.” 
Changing Paths to Retirement 
Prior research has documented the retirement transitions of indi-
viduals in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and illustrated the 
diversity of retirement choices that older Americans have made over 
the past two decades. The changing paths to retirement have been 
examined by Cahill, Giandrea, and Quinn (2006, 2011a, 2012, 2015) 
and Giandrea, Cahill, and Quinn (2008, 2009). These studies show 
the development of new transitions from career jobs to full retirement 
as individuals move to bridge jobs. Maestas (2010) shows the impor-
tance of returning to work after a period of being out of the labor 
force. While more than half of career employees in the HRS follow 
the traditional pattern of leaving a long-term job and entirely leaving 
the labor force, significant numbers of workers are choosing different 
steps from work to retirement. Some are choosing phased retirement, 
while others move to bridge jobs and self-employment. 
The probability of each type of first transition varies by the 
individual’s cohort and by the age at which the retirement transition 
begins. If an individual leaves her career employer at an older age, she 
is more likely to follow the traditional retirement pattern; if she leaves 
at a younger age, she is more likely to take an alternative path into 
retirement (Clark and Morrill 2015). The diversity of retirement paths 
reflects variation in worker preferences for continued employment 
and employers’ willingness to retain or hire older workers. Changes in 
retirement paths highlight the need to understand why some employ-
ers are concerned with delayed retirement by career employees while 
other employers are willing to hire these same workers. 
Greater incidence of moving from career jobs to bridge jobs raises 
the important question of whether this is due to employee preferences 
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or employer constraints. Individuals could be moving to new jobs in 
an effort to find lower-stress employment, shorter hours of work, or 
simply a change in type of work. However, this could also be because 
employers cannot or do not want to accommodate employees’ prefer-
ences for restructuring employment conditions. 
DELAYED RETIREMENT: IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS
It is clear that retirement transitions for career workers are chang-
ing. At the same time, employers may be resistant to delayed retire-
ment or to creating alternative work arrangements for older workers. 
There has been too little research examining why firms may continue 
to want employees to retire at the traditional retirement ages. This 
analysis seeks to quantify potential cost and productivity differentials 
that influence employer concerns associated with delayed retirement. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of delayed retirement on the cost and 
productivity of firms and institutions. When workers delay retirement 
from career jobs, the average age of employees rises. Employers must 
then consider how having older workers represent a higher propor-
tion of their workforce might impact their productivity and produc-
tion costs. When the age structure of the workforce changes, this will 
affect the prospects of promotion for early and midcareer workers. 
These changes may, in turn, inhibit an employer’s ability to attract 
and/or retain new and midcareer employees. 
Chapter 2 also discusses whether different factors affect the will-
ingness of employers to hire older workers as compared to the reluc-
tance of career employers to accommodate later retirement. These 
shifts in employers might involve changes in a worker’s occupation, 
industry, hours of work, compensation, and level of responsibility. It 
is important to understand why these new employers are receptive 
to hiring older workers who have retired from their career employ-
ers. For example, new employers may find it easier to offer jobs with 
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new working conditions, responsibilities, and wage levels that are 
more suitable to older workers’ skills and preferences. In comparison, 
career employers that try to modify existing terms of employment 
may be accused of violating age discrimination laws. In addition, new 
jobs may involve fewer hours, so employers may not have to provide 
certain benefits such as pensions, health insurance, and paid leave. 
Therefore, the hourly (total) compensation could be considerably 
lower than is possible in career jobs. 
Chapter 3 considers the special cases of phased retirement and 
return-to-work employment contracts that allow older workers to 
remain with their career employers but with reduced hours and per-
haps at lower ranks. Such changes might involve shifts in respon-
sibilities and hourly compensation. One important constraint in an 
employer’s ability to make these adjustments is federal retirement 
policies and age discrimination regulations. Do policies encourage 
or limit changes in compensation and working conditions that would 
result in greater use of phased retirement? An interesting observation 
is that phased retirement programs are widespread in higher educa-
tion and are generally viewed as good for the institution as well as 
for the professor. The discussion explores why these policies are not 
viewed positively by employers in general.
Chapter 4 explores the role of government policies and regula-
tions in the cost to firms of employing older workers and the ability 
of employers to modify employment contracts. Key policies include 
those that affect the value of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, 
and other programs to older persons and the retirement incentives 
embedded in these programs. Potential changes in government pro-
grams such as Social Security and Medicare may increase the need for 
income in retirement and thus encourage later retirement. We review 
possible amendments to these plans that could reduce the employ-
ment cost of older workers and hence decrease employer concerns 
about delayed retirement. State and federal age discrimination laws 
are then examined to identify how these policies affect the ability of 
employers to modify employment contracts to retain older workers.
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Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the importance of con-
sidering the employer perspective on working longer. It is clear that 
demographic and economic changes will continue to provide incen-
tives for individuals to remain in the labor force until older ages. An 
important question is whether employers will have the desire and 
ability to provide appropriate job opportunities to accommodate the 
desire for later retirement. 
This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the costs and 
other issues that influence an employer’s willingness to accommo-
date the desire of employees for delayed retirement. The analysis is 
based on economic theory along with evidence on age patterns of 
productivity and cost. We highlight policies and programs that could 
mitigate these concerns and thus reduce employer resistance to later 
retirement. The aging of the labor force and the rising proportion of 
persons aged 60 and over who seek to remain active in the labor force 
will provide economic and labor market pressures for employers to 
consider how best to accommodate delayed retirement.
Notes
1. In the economics literature, the term bridge jobs is used to denote jobs 
that older workers move to after leaving their career employers. This 
new employment can be full or part time and can be in similar or differ-
ent industries compared to their career jobs.
2. These changes include raising the full retirement age, which is math-
ematically equivalent to reducing annual benefits and increasing ben-
efit adjustment by delaying initial claiming of Social Security benefits. 
Shoven and Slavov (2014a,b) show the gain in lifetime benefits from 
late claiming of Social Security benefits.
3. This same example could be used to show how longevity gains will 
increase the cost to employers who provide defined benefit plans to their 
workers, as more years of payouts imply greater cost to the pension 
plan. The risk to the plan sponsor of rising life expectancy is one rea-
son employers have shifted away from defined benefit plans and toward 
defined contribution plans. In defined contribution plans, the worker/
retiree bears longevity risk.
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4. Most defined benefit plans in the private sector are financed solely by 
employer contributions. Thus, increases in longevity, holding other plan 
characteristics constant result in higher employer costs. In contrast, pub-
lic sector plans typically require employee contributions, which can be 
raised as plan costs increase.
5.  Approximately one-quarter of all public employees are not included in the 
Social Security system. As a result, they do not pay the payroll tax 
that supports this plan and do not earn credits toward future retirement 
benefits.
6. Originally, the full retirement age was set at 65; however, 1983 amend-
ments increased the full retirement age to 66 for individuals born 
between 1943 and 1954. The full retirement age is scheduled to increase 
to age 67 for individuals born after 1960. Increases in the full retire-
ment age are basically across the board reductions in annual benefits for 
individuals claiming benefits at each age. See http://www.socialsecurity 
.gov/planners/retire/agereduction.html (accessed September 1, 2016). 
7. The PIA is based on the highest 35 years of wage-index annual earn-
ings and a progressive benefit formula. The actual benefit received by a 
claimant depends on the age at which benefits are claimed. 
8. Munnell and Chen (2015) use a cohort analysis of the age of claiming 
Social Security benefits and find that the proportion of recent cohorts 
claiming benefits at age 62 has fallen to 36 percent for men and 40 per-
cent for women.
9. The impact of claiming age on monthly benefits is nicely illustrated in 
When to Start Receiving Retirement Benefits, https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
EN-05-10147.pdf (accessed September 1, 2016).
10. Shoven and Slavov (2013) provide a detailed review of claiming options 
and how delaying the start of Social Security benefits increases lifetime 
benefits.
11. For the past 30 years, the National Bureau of Economic Research’s 
aging program has made significant contributions to research on pen-
sions and aging through a series of books and research papers edited by 
David Wise and colleagues. Munnell and Sass (2007) also provide an 
overview of the labor supply choices of older Americans. 
12. Munnell and Chen (2015) examine the cohort-adjusted age of claiming 
Social Security benefits and conclude that few persons reaching age 62 
are starting benefits at the earliest possible age.

 Chapter 2
Costs	and	Benefits	of 
Delayed Retirement
When individuals seek to extend their working careers, they may 
prefer to continue in their same positions and receive the same total 
compensation for several additional years. As workers opt to delay 
retirement, employers must consider the costs and benefits associ-
ated with having these workers remain in their positions longer. 
For example, retaining workers until older ages might have adverse 
effects on the prospects of promotion for midcareer workers and the 
hiring of entry-level employees. On the other hand, retaining expe-
rienced workers with considerable company-specific human capital 
may positively affect company operations. Older, more senior work-
ers generally cost more in terms of higher salaries, more expensive 
health insurance, and more accumulated benefits that increase with 
years of service, such as paid time off or sick leave. Employers must 
determine whether these additional costs are offset or exacerbated by 
differences in productivity. 
Having older workers represent a greater proportion of the labor 
force likely imposes both costs and benefits on employers. For indi-
viduals to work longer, markets must adjust properly so that employ-
ing older workers is cost effective for firms. While individual employ-
ers might seek to implement policies that reduce the compensation of 
their older workers who delay retirement, in the long run we antici-
pate macroeconomic changes in labor market conditions associated 
with an increased supply of older workers wishing to postpone retire-
ment. For example, an increase in old age labor supply is predicted 
to lead to labor market adjustments, such as lower relative wages for 
older workers.1
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PRODUCTIVITY AND EARNINGS AGE PROFILES: 
IMPACT ON THE COST OF PRODUCTION 
The demand for workers of different ages and/or vintages will 
depend on two basic age-specific factors: compensation and produc-
tivity. Both of these factors have received considerable attention in 
the economics literature. We now consider how relative compensa-
tion levels (market wages) and productivity of older workers affects 
employers’ willingness to accommodate delayed or prolonged retire-
ment transitions of career employees. 
Economists have long observed that wages tend to rise with age 
and job tenure but at a diminishing rate (e.g., Ben-Porath [1967]; 
Mincer [1974]). These observations led to the development of human 
capital theory by Schultz (1963) and Becker (1964), which links 
investments in education and on-the-job training to increases in pro-
ductivity, which are rewarded by employers in the form of higher 
wages in the postinvestment years. Becker (p. 153) writes, “Most 
investments in human capital—e.g., formal education, on-the-job 
training, or migration—raise observed earnings at older ages because 
returns are part of earnings then, and lower them at younger ages, 
because costs are deducted from earnings at that time.” 
Schultz (1963) reached a similar conclusion: “Except for some 
pure rent (in earnings) for differences in inherited abilities, most of 
the differences in earnings are a consequence of differences in the 
amounts that have been invested in people.” These early studies focus 
exclusively on cash earnings and are based primarily on a spot mar-
ket theory that indicates workers are paid wages equal to the value 
of their productivity at each age. Thus, these theories suggest that 
continued gains in earnings with age reflect rising productivity. In 
other words, wages continue to equal productivity in each year so 
that higher-paid older workers do not represent a higher unit cost to 
employers. The model suggests that workers of different ages are sub-
stitutes but that labor costs have adjusted so that workers of all ages 
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are paid according to their productivity to the firm. If spot markets are 
the norm, firms have no incentive to retire older workers.
A decade later, labor economists began to focus more closely on 
long-term employment relationships between workers and firms. Rather 
than spot markets where wages equal productivity in every period, 
these models predicted that firms might tilt the age-earnings profile 
relative to the age-productivity profile so that workers were underpaid 
early in their careers but then overpaid relative to their productivity in 
the final years of their employment (see Lazear [1979, 1981]). The idea 
is that workers essentially post a bond early in their careers and the 
company repays workers with excess compensation in later working 
years.2 It was argued that this arrangement reduced turnover, helped to 
sort workers, and enhanced the profits of the firm. However, such con-
tracts require an end point (i.e., retirement) where the present value of 
lifetime compensation equals the present value of lifetime productivity. 
Given that workers are being paid more than their productivity during 
their later working years, these models provided a rationale for manda-
tory retirement policies and pensions that provided strong economic 
incentives for workers to retire at specific ages.3
To understand the employer’s perspective on working longer, 
one must first be able to measure worker productivity and its evolu-
tion over the life course. However, economists have found it difficult 
to gather data that would allow for tests of the competing theories 
regarding wage growth or to measure worker productivity over time. 
Over 50 years ago, the Department of Labor examined productivity 
and how it changes with age in various industries where output could 
more easily be measured, such as manufacturing jobs and jobs with 
piece-rate compensation. Munnell and Sass (2008, p. 98) review these 
older studies and conclude that “productivity past age 55 in more 
physically demanding tasks at best stays level but generally turns 
down.” They note that job characteristics have changed considerably 
over the last half century, and that research suggests older workers 
do have lower levels of productivity but that the “productivity gap” 
between younger and older workers has decreased. 
22   Clark and Morrill
A series of studies provide additional evidence of the age- 
productivity relationship. Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) use per-
formance measures by supervisors as an indicator of productivity and 
conclude that increases in productivity with job tenure explain only a 
small component of wage gains. Using data on new hires at Fortune 
1000 firms, Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) conclude that productiv-
ity exceeds earnings for young employees but that for older work-
ers earnings are greater than productivity. These studies support the 
notion that older workers are paid more than their value to firms and, 
as a result, employers have a desire to encourage older workers to 
retire. If these models are correct, an increase in the age of retirement 
would extend this period of overpayment and have adverse effects on 
company profits. As a result, firms would tend to resist increases in 
the average age of retirement of their employees in the short run. In 
the long run, firms might adjust the amount of annual overpayment, 
resulting in a different wage structure throughout the employment 
contract. 
In contrast, Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and Hellerstein, 
Neumark, and Troske (1999) find that age profiles of earnings and 
productivity for older and younger workers are very similar, provid-
ing some general support for the human capital theory of earnings 
growth. If their findings more accurately describe the labor market, 
firms will be indifferent to the retirement patterns of workers. Thus, 
employers would be more likely to accommodate the desire of some 
workers for later retirement. 
It is important to remember that employers in a competitive labor 
market must consider both productivity and market wages in making 
employment decisions. An employer seeking to determine the opti-
mal retirement age of its workers must compare the age-productivity 
profile to the age-compensation profile. Munnell and Sass (2008) rec-
ognize this point and claim that there will be a “productivity com-
pensation deficit” as workers age if the wages of older workers do 
not decline while productivity falls. As this deficit grows, employers 
could try to limit employment opportunities of older workers, resist 
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an increase in the retirement age, or attempt to alter wages to be in 
line with productivity. In a study of the age structure of various occu-
pations, Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy (2000) conclude that later 
retirement ages will lead to an increase in alternative work arrange-
ments and working conditions that will make working longer easier 
for workers. However, they speculate that there will likely be “a siz-
able number of older workers facing constrained opportunities both 
within and following their long-term career jobs” (p. 416).
One method of testing the relationship between productivity and 
earnings over the life course is to observe how earnings and compen-
sation profiles change in response to government and employer policy 
shifts and changes in the demographic composition of the potential 
labor force. Studies of the Japanese labor market provide some evi-
dence on these points. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) find that the age 
earnings profiles of Japanese workers were more steeply sloped than 
that for U.S. workers. Clark and Ogawa (1992a,b) update and extend 
this analysis to show that as the Japanese labor force aged and the 
mandatory retirement age was raised, annual compensation adjusted 
and the age earnings profiles flattened with the relative increase in the 
number of older workers. 
COST OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS BY AGE AND TENURE
To further complicate the tests of spot market versus long-term 
employment contracts, the nature of employment contracts has 
changed over the past half-century, and employee benefits have risen 
as a proportion of total labor costs. Defined benefit pension plans, 
health insurance for active workers, and retiree health plans provide 
additional back-loading to total compensation and increase the likeli-
hood that the marginal cost of labor from older workers exceeds the 
gain from their productivity. 
When considering employers’ costs of employees working lon-
ger, one must pay particular attention to the total cost of compensa-
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tion. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2016) reports that employee 
benefits account for about 30.3 percent of total compensation in the 
private sector and 36.4 percent of compensation in the public sector 
of the economy. Providing certain benefits to civilian workers consti-
tutes a large fraction of employment costs, such as health insurance 
(8.4 percent of total compensation), pension plans (5.1 percent of 
total compensation), and paid leave (6.9 percent of total compensa-
tion). The cost of providing these benefits will typically rise with the 
employees’ age and tenure. 
Furthermore, defined benefit pension plans typically include eco-
nomic incentives to retire at specific ages. The fact that these types of 
plans were widely adopted during the mid-twentieth century provides 
some evidence that long-term contracts were predominant during that 
time period. However, the significant shift away from defined benefit 
plans to defined contribution plans, along with the rapid decline in the 
incidence of retiree health insurance provision, may signal the end of 
long-term employment contracts and the resulting tilting of the com-
pensation profile compared to the productivity profile. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the proportion of workers covered by a 
defined benefit plan fell from 35 percent in the early 1990s to only 
18 percent in 2011. In addition, a rising proportion of defined benefit 
plans are now cash balance plans, which do not have the same higher 
cost for older workers that is found in traditional defined benefit plans. 
Figure 2.2 indicates that defined benefit plans are more frequently 
offered by large firms. It may be that compensation is being restruc-
tured to more closely reflect a spot market and that workers now have 
more flexibility to postpone retirement (Friedberg and Webb 2005; 
Hurd and Rohwedder 2011; Munnell, Cahill, and Jivan 2003).4 New 
types of employment contracts that allow for reduced hours and com-
pensation in later years may develop as a result of workers’ needs or 
desires to work longer. 
First, whether an employer self-funds health insurance or pur-
chases it from a third party, the total cost of offering health insurance 
will be a function of the size and age structure of its labor force. Hold-
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ing the number of workers constant, a larger share of older workers 
will imply a higher total cost of providing health insurance. Yama-
moto (2013) and Alemayehu and Warner (2004) provide detailed 
assessments of the relationship between age and health care costs. 
These studies note that as individuals age, annual health care costs 
increase substantially.5 Figure 2.3 illustrates how private health insur-
ance spending rose between 2002 and 2010 for different age groups 
using the National Health Expenditure Database. These data indicate 
that not only did annual private health insurance spending rise by 5.6 
percent on average between 2002 and 2010, but annual spending rose 
by 7.6 percent for individuals aged 45–64 over that same time period.6
Second, the cost of defined benefit plans, relative to cash com-
pensation, rises as workers acquire tenure and as they approach the 
early and normal retirement ages in the plan. However, after a worker 
passes these ages, the annual pension cost begins to fall with contin-
Figure	2.1		Decline	of	Defined	Benefit	Pension	Plans
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013b). 
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ued service. Thus, while a worker faces a strong retirement incentive 
from eligibility ages in the defined benefit pensions, an employer’s 
cost of retaining a worker beyond normal retirement age could be 
relatively lower if pension benefits do not accrue at such a high rate.7 
If there is no change in the specified retirement ages in these plans, 
and if individuals continue to work past the normal retirement age, 
then the pension cost to employers over the lifetimes of workers who 
work longer could actually decline. 
Historically, economic research indicates large spikes in retire-
ment rates around the early and normal retirement ages (Kotlikoff and 
Smith 1983; Kotlikoff and Wise 1987; Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 
1990). If these incentives to retire are retained, we expect employees 
to continue to retire from career jobs at normal retirement ages, even 
though they would prefer to work longer. Of course, after leaving the 
career job and accepting a retirement benefit, older workers may seek 
to either shift to phased retirement or return to work as a contract or 
part-time employee of their career employers. Chapter 3 further dis-
cusses these possibilities.
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Figure	2.2		Coverage	by	Defined	Benefit	Plans,	by	Firm	Size
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013b). 
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Alternatively, employers might modify their plans to accommo-
date a desire for later retirement and increase the normal retirement 
ages specified in the plan. They might also offer incentives for work-
ing longer, such as in-service pension distributions. Such changes to 
defined benefit plans could raise the benefit to employees of working 
longer while increasing the cost to employers. Of course, the propor-
tion of the labor force covered by defined benefit plans is declining. 
However, many sectors of the economy, particularly the public sector, 
will continue to grapple with the cost effectiveness of altering defined 
benefit pension plans in order to encourage or accommodate longer 
working lives. 
Defined contribution plans are now the most widely used type of 
retirement plan. In most cases, employers specify a fixed percent of 
employee contributions that is matched by the employee. For exam-
ple, an employer may match 100 percent of employee contributions 
up to 6 percent of the employee’s salary. Thus, employer costs as a 
percentage of salary will tend to be constant across age and tenure, 
provided that employees of all tenure contribute the same percentage 
Figure 2.3  Levels of Private Health Insurance Spending, by Age Group
SOURCE: National Health Expenditure Database, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group. 
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of salary. Considerable evidence indicates that younger workers are 
less likely to contribute to these plans and, when enrolled, contrib-
ute a smaller percentage of their salaries. Thus, it is likely that the 
actual employer cost of matching contributions still increases with 
employees’ age and service. In addition, some employers have vari-
able match rates that increase with age and tenure. 
Finally, BLS (2013a) reports that paid leave is the most preva-
lent employee benefit provided by employers in private industry, with 
84 percent of workers receiving vacation, holiday, or personal leave. 
Paid holidays and paid vacations are the most common forms of paid 
leave, with 72 percent of workers receiving both. In addition, 61 per-
cent of private sector workers were covered by sick leave plans. The 
cost to employers for providing paid leave in 2016 was $2.20 per 
hour, equal to about 6.9 percent of total compensation (BLS 2016). If 
the amount of paid leave increases with tenure, the cost to employers 
of providing this benefit will rise. For example, the average number 
of paid vacation days for newly hired employees is around 10 days 
per year. In many companies, vacation time increases with tenure so 
that after 20 years of service workers receive an average of 20 days of 
paid vacation per year. Assuming a potential work year of 260 days, 
vacation time for new workers would represent 3.8 percent of poten-
tial work time, while senior employees would be receiving 7.7 per-
cent. We know of no studies that have tried to incorporate the cost of 
vacation time into an analysis of the relative cost to the firm of senior 
workers compared to new hires. 
Including the cost of employee benefits in total compensation 
implies that the age compensation profile will be steeper than the 
more easily measured age earnings profile. Thus, economic studies 
that have compared earnings to the value of productivity have under-
estimated the potential gap between pay and performance at older 
ages. The larger this gap, the greater the concern of employers about 
extending the normal retirement age. 
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VINTAGE EFFECTS ON SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE
The previous discussion is largely based on the concept that there 
is only one type of labor and that differences in productivity across 
workers are due to differences in investment in human capital over 
time. This implies that if older workers are more productive than 
younger workers, employers could just hire additional younger work-
ers to make up for the loss of a more productive older worker through 
retirement. Alternatively, if older workers delay retirement, employ-
ers could respond by hiring fewer younger workers to maintain a con-
stant level of productivity. 
But what if older workers are actually different in their skill sets 
based on years of experience and institutional knowledge? In fact, 
they might be sufficiently different that the employer considers them 
two distinct types of labor. For example, Levine and Mitchell (1988) 
find that younger males are complements with older men, implying 
that employers need to find the optimal mix of young and old work-
ers. Thus, employers would desire to maintain a sufficient number 
of older workers who provide the experience necessary for the orga-
nization to operate smoothly. Similarly, if younger workers bring a 
new vintage of human capital and skills that older workers cannot 
match, firms will have a strong desire to maintain an adequate level 
of new hires. It may be that older workers serve as mentors to younger 
workers, and that an optimal age structure for an employer has a mix 
of workers with different vintages of human capital. The age struc-
ture of a firm’s labor force matters, and employers will develop their 
compensation to provide economic incentives that help them attract, 
retain, and retire workers in a manner that produces the optimal age 
structure of their workforce. 
In such a model, employers would determine the total number 
of workers and the age composition of their workforces based on the 
cost and productivity of each type of labor input and the comple-
mentarities between workers of different vintages. How will firms 
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respond to changes in market conditions that are due to changes in the 
desired retirement age or shifts in total labor supply between younger 
and older workers? 
PROMOTION AND TIME IN GRADE 
If an employer accommodates the desire for later retirement 
ages, and if there is no change in the demand for its product, then 
an employer might have to reduce the rate of new hiring. As a result, 
the firm’s labor force would become older. Delayed retirement may 
reduce promotional opportunities and thus increase time in grade 
for younger workers. The option of later retirement might appeal 
to current older workers, but how will younger workers and poten-
tial new hires feel about having to spend more years in lower-level 
jobs? Slower promotion may make employment in firms with higher 
retirement ages less appealing to younger workers, which implies that 
employers should consider the impact of later retirement on their cur-
rent and future labor force.  
Previous research has relied on demographic models of population 
aging to understand how later retirement and lower rates of retirement 
affect the advancement of younger workers. In early work using pop-
ulation life tables, Keyfitz (1973) develops a demographic model that 
illustrates how lower rates of population growth, and hence the aging 
of the population, would slow the rate of mobility up the employment 
hierarchy.8 He uses the same model to illustrate the impact of labor 
force growth on individuals’ advancement to higher-paying jobs and 
management positions. This model has been extended to further illus-
trate the impact of population aging, the elimination of mandatory 
retirement, and the resulting increase in the labor force participation 
rate of older persons on the prospects of promotion for younger work-
ers (see Cantrell and Clark [1980, 1982]; Clark and Cantrell [1986]; 
Clark and Ghent [2010]). These papers indicate how the extension 
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of work life implies that more years of service are required before a 
person reaches any given rank in the employment hierarchy. 
Clark and Cantrell (1986) expand the model of promotion by 
focusing on a single industry and show how changes in personnel 
and compensation policies might affect exit rates and hence the age 
structure of the academic labor market. They derive how these alter-
native futures affect promotional prospects and the age at which vari-
ous ranks are attained. These studies all suggest that if older work-
ers delay retirement, the age structure of the labor force will become 
older and there will be fewer promotion opportunities for younger 
employees. Thus, delayed retirement implies delayed promotion and 
more years of service to attain each rank in the job hierarchy. 
However, the decline in upward mobility can be moderated if 
older workers do not remain in top jobs as they extend their working 
careers. This can be accomplished through reductions in job responsi-
bilities or by older workers entering phased retirement. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, phased retirement provides new opportunities to older 
workers to keep working at reduced levels and tempers the impact on 
the promotion prospects for younger workers. Furthermore, a firm 
may adjust hiring or career structures to accommodate longer work-
ing lives and some period of reduced responsibility and time commit-
ment during later employment years. 
SUMMARY OF EMPLOYERS’ CONCERNS ABOUT 
DELAYED RETIREMENT
The relationship between compensation and productivity, and 
the function of how these factors change as workers age, are cen-
tral to the willingness of employers to facilitate older-age retirement. 
Compensation is generally observable, although it requires a com-
plete accounting for the total cost of employment, including benefits. 
However, employee productivity is more difficult to measure. It may 
also be difficult to link productivity to individual workers if there are 
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complementarities between workers of different vintages of human 
capital. We do know that annual earnings and the average cost of 
benefits rise with age. If productivity increases at a slower rate (or 
even declines) with age, employers will note that they tend to overpay 
older workers on an annual basis and thus will not want to extend 
their employees’ working lives. Because of a lack of quantifiable data 
on employee productivity, relatively few studies have attempted to 
directly compare and contrast life-cycle patterns of compensation and 
productivity. Some notable exceptions can be found in the literature 
on the economics of education, where productivity is approximated by 
student test score gains (e.g., Wiswall [2013] and references therein).
Not only is it difficult to measure the productivity of individuals, 
but we expect there to be complementarities between workers as well. 
In most settings, employees do not work in isolation. It may be that 
they work as a team, but complementarities can even be seen in envi-
ronments where there is no teamwork but peer effects alter behav-
ior. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) find positive productivity 
spillovers from a highly productive cashier in a large supermarket 
chain. Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim (2014) find that early retirement 
incentives caused older teachers to retire earlier. Even though the 
most experienced teachers left, the authors find little effect on student 
outcomes. In addition to our wanting to understand how individuals’ 
productivity varies over the life cycle, it would also be useful to mea-
sure how retirements affect the workers left behind. 
Of course, employers make productivity and compensation com-
parisons all the time. This occurs in annual performance reviews and 
merit raises. It is important to remember that the issue in question 
is not whether an individual older worker remains productive but 
whether her current (and future) level of productivity is sufficient 
to justify her current (and future) salary if her work life is suddenly 
extended. If employers believe that compensation exceeds productiv-
ity, and that the difference is likely to increase if retirement is delayed, 
then company leaders will desire to retain policies that encourage 
retirement at the traditional retirement ages. If workers are to be given 
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the opportunity to remain in their career jobs, the focus must be on 
whether firms can adjust their employment and compensation policies 
so that, on average, workers have the option to delay retirement. Fur-
thermore, delaying retirement will alter the age structure of the labor 
force, the stock of human capital and skills, the rate of promotion of 
younger workers, and the ability to hire younger employees. 
DIFFERENCES ACROSS THE ECONOMY
This chapter identifies important economic factors that influence 
the willingness of employers to retain older workers past the nor-
mal retirement age. For some firms, these concerns will be dominant 
and will seek to provide incentives for older workers to retire in a 
traditional fashion at the specified retirement ages. For others, the 
costs will be less important, and their retention policies may be very 
different. The analysis identifies some employment and compensa-
tion characteristics that should lead to labor market sorting into jobs 
where older workers are a significant proportion of the workforce. 
The sectors employing older workers could either be attracting and 
hiring new workers (as in bridge jobs) or retaining career workers 
for a longer span. Industries in which compensation packages tend 
not to include retirement plans, health insurance benefits, and paid 
time off likely would see a larger fraction of older workers. Similarly, 
firms with a less steep employment hierarchy with fewer promotional 
opportunities, and where specific human capital is less important, 
may be more open to retaining older workers. 
Firms with performance-based pay that more closely matches 
the spot market system will be more likely to retain older workers, 
because productivity declines would be matched with compensa-
tion declines. In addition, firms that rely more heavily on merit pay, 
where annual earnings are directly related to annual performance, 
will be less concerned with productivity declines with age. Studies 
by Hutchens (1986, 1988) in the United States and Heywood, Jirjahn, 
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and Tsertsvardze (2010) in Germany highlight the impact of firm com-
pensation policies on retaining older employees as opposed to hiring 
new older workers. Back-loading of compensation as part of implicit 
contracts results in lower turnover rates of older career employees, 
but it makes firms more reluctant to hire older individuals because of 
their higher labor costs.
Even within firms, we expect to see that some occupations allow 
for more job flexibility and have working conditions that are able 
to accommodate the needs of older workers. Cahill, Giandrea, and 
Quinn (2011b) find that older workers tend to seek jobs with fewer 
hours of work, often through a late career job change that is part of a 
retirement transition. Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy (2000, p. 407) 
provide a detailed assessment of the occupations for which older men 
and women are most likely to be able to remain on the job. Older 
men tend to have more employment opportunities in occupations 
requiring “few physical demands, flexible hours and schedules, and, 
for the most part, low skill and training requirements,” while women 
are most likely to be found as “household workers, welfare service 
aides, religious workers, and crossing guards.” Hirsch, Macpherson, 
and Hardy also find that jobs requiring evening and night shift work 
are less likely to employ or hire older women, while flexible work-
ing hours had a positive impact on female employment. However, 
these requirements do not seem to be related to male employment 
opportunities. The authors also document that more rapidly rising age 
earnings profiles tend to reduce employment opportunities for older 
workers. Their analysis clearly shows the differences associated with 
retaining older workers who delay retirement versus hiring new older 
workers in bridge employment.
In summary, the importance of skills and preferences of employ-
ees, along with job characteristics and compensation policies, influ-
ence whether firms think their career workers become costlier as 
retirement is delayed. This impact varies substantially across firms 
throughout the economy. These same factors determine the willing-
ness of firms to hire older workers.
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Notes
1. Clark and Ogawa (1992a) show that when the age of mandatory retire-
ment in Japan was increased from 55 to 60, the relative wages of older 
workers declined. The flattening of the age earnings profiles reduced the 
employers’ costs of adjusting their employment contracts as the propor-
tion of older workers in their labor force increased (Matsukura, Ogawa, 
and Clark 2007). 
2. The “bond” is the difference between the value of the workers’ produc-
tivity (implicitly, their opportunity wage at other firms) and their wages 
early in their careers. 
3. Hutchens (1989) and Skirbekk (2008) provide nice summaries of the 
alternative theories explaining the growth of earnings with age and 
review the evidence on how productivity changes with age. Also see 
Bloom and Sousa-Poza (2013). 
4. Greater worker mobility may indicate that workers are now less inter-
ested in a long-term relationship with a single employer. More fre-
quent layoffs and plant closings also provide a signal to employees that 
employers may renege on such contracts. 
5. The Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational 
Trust (2015) report on employer-provided health plans illustrates the 
proportion of the workforce covered by health plans and the rising cost 
of these plans over time.
6. Data are from http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and 
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
Downloads/2010GenderandAgeTables.pdf (accessed December 2015).
7. This lower cost to the employer is the other side of the decline in the 
growth rate of the pension wealth of older workers as they remain on the 
job past the early and normal retirement ages. 
8. Keyfitz (1973) was primarily interested in showing the impact of popu-
lation on labor force advancement through the employment hierarchy. 
He defines rank as the ratio of the number of workers above a person to 
the number of workers below him. His base model assumes that every-
one is hired at the same age, that there is a fixed relationship between 
supervisors and lower-tier employees, that all workers move at the same 
rate through the job hierarchy, and that there is a fixed retirement age. 
Turnover and retirement rates speed the movement up the job hierarchy. 
Clark and Cantrell (1986) use work life tables instead of life tables to 
examine similar changes. 

Chapter 3
Alternative Late Career 
Employment Arrangements
As individuals age, they may wish to continue paid employment 
but with reduced hours or responsibilities. Employers that are inter-
ested in retaining older workers might offer a contract, either formal or 
informal, whereby select older workers continue their career employ-
ment but with reduced hours or in a new position. The employee 
might be offered lower compensation or reduced responsibilities but 
also more flexibility, different working conditions, and fewer work 
hours. This transition could entail a shift in job assignments, or the 
employee could continue doing the same tasks but only work a part of 
the day, fewer days per week, or full time for part of the year. Defined 
this way, phased retirement could be considered a form of job sharing, 
as employers use phased retirees to staff their labor force needs. Simi-
larly, individuals might return to work after claiming a pension with 
a break in service. This chapter examines the conditions that influ-
ence employers’ ability and willingness to adopt policies that allow 
for alternative late-career employment arrangements beyond simply 
postponing retirement. Both employers and employees might benefit 
from a continuing employment arrangement, given a built-up stock of 
employer-specific human capital. However, programs such as phased 
retirement or return to work may prove difficult to implement because 
of pension regulations and concerns over age discrimination. 
THE EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE OF  
PHASED RETIREMENT 
There are relatively few broad-based phased retirement programs 
in the private sector. Furthermore, many employers seem uninterested 
in including such a program as part of their future human resource 
policies (McGill et al. 2010). 
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Employers develop phased retirement plans to achieve certain 
human resource objectives. Of course, the success of these policies 
hinges on whether older workers will want to enroll in the phased 
retirement plan, given the employment terms, wage levels, and ben-
efits that are offered. Employers can make these plans relatively 
cost neutral (half-time pay for half-time effort) or they can provide 
incentives to encourage older workers to move into phased retire-
ment (three-quarters pay for half-time work). Phased retirement plans 
usually specify a predetermined departure date that ends the employ-
er’s commitment to providing phased retirement to the individual 
employee. An important factor is whether retirees that are in phased 
retirement continue to receive benefits, especially health insurance. 
Another major aspect of phased programs is how the nature of 
job assignments changes as older workers move into phased retire-
ment. Phased retirement plans may be general in nature and cover all 
employees or can be used on an individual basis in an effort to retain 
certain employees. Hutchens and Papps (2004) and Rappaport (2001) 
both report that employers tend to favor informal phased retirement 
programs that allow employers to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether older workers will be given the option of phased retirement. 
The decision to adopt a phased retirement program is linked to 
many of the same issues discussed earlier regarding employer reac-
tions to delayed retirement. In some cases, firms may want to retain 
older workers and the skills and experience they have acquired. 
Facing increased retirements associated with aging baby boomers, 
these employers may find that phased retirement encourages older 
workers to remain on the job and provides the level of institutional 
knowledge necessary for high levels of productivity for all workers. 
Other employers may believe that they have achieved the optimal age 
structure of their labor force and will be less willing to offer phased 
retirement for cost and productivity reasons. Thus, a key factor in the 
decision to adopt phased retirement plans is whether employers think 
it will encourage high-value workers to leave full-time employment 
sooner than they would without this option. Alternatively, eligible 
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employees could tack on additional years of phased retirement to the 
previously planned age of full retirement rather than simply retiring 
earlier than planned. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) develop a simulation model for 
workers choosing between full-time employment, phased retirement, 
and complete retirement. Their analysis indicates that if all employ-
ers adopted plans that allowed workers to enter phased retirement at 
their current hourly wages, there would be a substantial increase in 
phased retirement and a somewhat smaller reduction in full retire-
ment. Employers must also consider whether phased retirement might 
appear to be a legal method to encourage less-productive workers 
to retire more quickly from full-time employment and enter phased 
retirement. 
Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) consider three hypotheses for 
why firms differ in their preferences for phased retirement policies. 
They focus on minimum hours constraints, employee demand, and 
the presence of defined benefit pension plans. Building on the earlier 
work of Gustman and Steinmeier (1983), the authors develop a sim-
ple model of a profit-maximizing firm and posit that firms that impose 
a minimum hours constraint on all employees are less likely to have 
adopted phased retirement policies. The underlying theory behind 
this relationship is the production technology and the need for team-
work, whereby part-time employees or “substitute” workers might 
reduce the productivity of the team. They note that if employees have 
a preference for phased retirement and are willing to accept lower 
wages to have it, then firms are more likely to offer this benefit as 
part of the employment contract with a compensating differential of 
lower wages. Individuals who prefer having the option to phase into 
retirement might then cluster together in firms that offer this benefit. 
Surveys of employers indicate that relatively few companies 
have adopted formal phased retirement programs. For example, Rap-
paport (2001) reports that a survey by William Mercer finds that less 
than one-quarter of employers surveyed had adopted formal phased 
retirement programs. Two surveys of older workers by Watson Wyatt 
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Worldwide (1999, 2004) indicate that there may be some increase in 
the incidence of phased retirement plans. The first survey finds that 
only 16 percent of large employers offered any type of phased retire-
ment, while the latter survey reports that 40 percent of employers had 
policies allowing employees to phase into retirement on their cur-
rent jobs. The 2004 report concludes that phasing will likely become 
increasingly prevalent as the baby boomers enter their retirement 
years. One should keep in mind that these surveys are small in scale 
and are not representative of the entire labor market. 
REGULATORY FRICTIONS
The lack of interest by employers in establishing phased retire-
ment programs may be due to legal and regulatory policies associ-
ated with retirement plans, tax policies, and age discrimination laws. 
McGill et al. (2010, Chapter 8) provide a detailed account of fed-
eral policies that impact the payment of a retirement benefit from a 
defined benefit plan and how they have evolved over the past decade. 
Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) note that defined benefit pen-
sion plans may be an obstacle to phased retirement because of the 
relationship between final salary and retirement benefits. If phased 
retirees continue to be covered by a defined benefit plan, and phased 
years and the salary earned during these years are used to calculate 
retirement benefits, then annual benefits could be lowered by the 
individual’s having spent time in phased retirement.1 Obviously, this 
would make phased retirement less desirable. In contrast, participa-
tion in defined contribution plans can determine the date a worker 
initiates withdrawals and begins to draw down retirement wealth. 
Delaying the start of the draw-down from a defined contribution plan 
increases the potential annual annuity that ultimately can be paid.2
IRS tax law prohibits individuals from working full time in a 
position covered by a defined benefit pension while also receiving 
a benefit from that same plan except under certain circumstances, as 
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modified by the Pension Protection Act. If a worker is incentivized 
to retire at a specific age because of the pension structure, it may be 
appealing to enter into a new type of employment contract with the 
career employer. For example, a worker could become a contractor. In 
this case, rather than a formal phased retirement program, there may 
be indirect channels of returning to work.
To investigate the role of minimum hours and pension policies 
in the adoption of phased retirement programs, Hutchens and Grace-
Martin (2006) examine a sample of 950 establishments (not in agri-
culture or mining) with 20 or more employees. Their empirical results 
indicate that minimum hours constraints are important to consider and 
also suggest that the existence of defined benefit pension plans make 
phased retirement policies less likely. However, they find no evidence 
that employee preferences increase the likelihood of being covered 
by phased retirement policies. Significant differences in the incidence 
of phased retirement policies are found across occupations, and larger 
firms are more likely to have established phased retirement policies 
than smaller firms. Employer interviews also indicate that firms often 
have informal policies that allow some employees to shift to part-time 
employment at the end of their working careers. 
PHASED RETIREMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
One sector of the economy that seems particularly well suited for 
phased retirement is higher education. Conley (2007) reports results 
from a survey conducted by the American Association of American 
University Presses that indicate 32 percent of universities had formal 
phased retirement programs. Allen (2005) describes the advantages to 
universities of offering phased retirement and reviews the incidence of 
these plans in higher education.3 He concludes that phased retirement 
can be a win-win in higher education. Workloads of career faculty are 
relatively easy to divide (e.g., teaching courses during one semester 
and then not working one semester). Universities gain from phased 
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retirement because career faculty members are typically required to 
give up tenure in exchange for a reduced workload. In many plans, 
the program is relatively cost neutral, as the cost of two phased retir-
ees is similar to the cost of one full-time professor. Faculty gain from 
phased retirement since they are allowed to gradually disengage from 
the university. During phased retirement, faculty may actually have 
higher total income than when they worked full time, depending on 
their utilization of pension and Social Security income combined with 
their half-time salary from the university. 
Allen, Clark, and Ghent (2004) examine the impact of a phased 
retirement system adopted by the University of North Carolina (UNC) 
system of 16 campuses.4 The UNC program required faculty to relin-
quish tenure and sign a three-year contract that provided 50 percent of 
preretirement pay for 50 percent effort, followed by complete retire-
ment. Prior to the introduction of this program, the retirement rate of 
faculty 50 and older was 8.7 percent. After the plan was introduced, 
the total retirement rate (full plus phased retirement) increased to 
about 10.5 percent in the first three years of the program. About 30 
percent of total retirements were faculty entering the phased retire-
ment program. The authors conclude, “On balance, the introduction 
of phased retirement in the UNC system seems to have been benefi-
cial from both employee and employer perspectives” (p. 124).5
AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
To protect older workers from employer discrimination, federal 
and state laws prohibit the use of a worker’s age in making an employ-
ment decision (hiring, promotion, compensation, and retention). The 
1968 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) made dis-
crimination against workers aged 40–65 illegal. Since the upper age 
was capped at 65, employers could continue to impose mandatory 
retirement at age 65 or above. In 1978, the ADEA was amended to 
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cover workers up to age 70. To comply, firms had to either eliminate 
their mandatory retirement policies or raise the age to 70. The ADEA 
was amended once again in 1986 to prohibit discrimination against 
all workers aged 40 and over, thus effectively eliminating the use of 
mandatory retirement and other age-based policies, except in certain 
sectors of the economy and among certain highly paid employees. 
Although ending mandatory retirement seems like a benefit for 
older workers, it may have had unintended consequences. For exam-
ple, Lahey (2008) finds that employers reacted to age discrimination 
policies by reducing older worker employment. 
In addition to ending mandatory retirement, the ADEA requires 
firms to modify other employment policies that might adversely affect 
older workers. Thus, employers may worry about the legal implica-
tions associated with phased retirement policies that reduce hourly 
wages and result in lower-status jobs. Furthermore, employers may 
believe that they need to treat all workers equally when adjusting 
wages or providing alternative end-of-career work arrangements (see 
Neumark [2009] for a detailed discussion). They may be concerned 
that any modifications in job titles, responsibilities, and compensation 
that would make older workers more attractive to retain would be 
considered age discriminatory. Thus, not all employers would con-
sider adopting some of the adjustments discussed in this review.
For the most part, research on age discrimination has focused on 
the impact of laws that mandate that firms treat older workers equally 
in hiring, training, and compensation. While most research indicates 
that the opportunities of older workers have improved, some studies 
suggest that firms are more reluctant to hire older workers because 
of the stronger legal protections (e.g., Lahey [2008]; Neumark and 
Button [2014]). It is possible that these laws restrict employers from 
developing policies that accommodate the preferences of older work-
ers if it means giving up status and employee benefits. 
More research is needed to evaluate whether government poli-
cies permit career employers to modify working conditions of older 
workers without violating their rights or leaving them vulnerable to 
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discrimination. Phased retirement could become an important com-
ponent of the retirement transition by allowing productive workers 
to remain with their career employers while compensation and work-
ing conditions are modified. Federal and state governments should 
examine whether age discrimination laws, tax policies, and pension 
regulations should be modified to remove restrictions that limit the 
use of phased retirement programs. 
WILL PHASED RETIREMENT BE AN IMPORTANT 
RETIREMENT PATH IN THE FUTURE? 
Economic studies and data analyses indicate that a large propor-
tion of career employees would like the option of phasing into retire-
ment on their current jobs. However, many of the studies of individual 
responses to the availability of phased retirement are dated, and most 
use survey responses from the Health and Retirement Study. Much 
has changed for older persons in the labor market in the past three 
decades. The trend toward early retirement has been reversed, and 
labor force participation rates of older workers have increased. Future 
research should address two key questions. First, how has delayed 
retirement from full-time career jobs affected the demand for phased 
retirement? Clark and Morrill (2015) find that individuals leaving 
career jobs in their fifties are more likely to enter phased retirement 
or bridge jobs than retirees in their sixties. Second, how has the 
continued decline in the coverage of defined benefit plans affected 
retirement transitions? Participants in defined contribution plans may 
find that phased retirement is less beneficial to them since they have 
greater control of the utilization of their retirement wealth. 
The U.S. Department of Labor (2008) held hearings on the 
demand for phased retirement by employees and the barriers that 
inhibit employers from establishing phased retirement programs. 
Johnson (2011) discusses how age discrimination laws and pension 
regulations interact to restrict the adoption of phased retirement plans 
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(see also Fields and Hutchens [2002]). Recent changes in federal 
legislation to allow in-service distribution of pension benefits after 
employees have attained the normal retirement age have moderated a 
significant impediment to phased retirement. Limited evidence indi-
cates that the incidence of phased retirement varies across employers 
and sectors of the economy, due in part to production techniques and 
the divisibility of job tasks. Hill (2010) discusses these legal barri-
ers, as well as company-specific characteristics that restrict or limit 
employers’ ability to adopt phased retirement plans, such as the types 
of jobs, the organizational structure of the firm, and the characteristics 
of employees. 
Interestingly, the federal government has recently adopted a 
phased retirement program for its own workforce and issued basic 
guidelines governing which federal workers are eligible and what 
terms of employment are acceptable. Employees who meet the eli-
gibility requirements may continue working on a part-time basis 
with the agreement of their agencies. These phased retirees can 
receive a partial retirement benefit and will continue to accrue ser-
vice credits that will be used in the determination of their ultimate 
retirement benefit. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guide-
lines state that phased retirees must spend 20 percent of their time 
mentoring younger employees. OPM Director Katherine Archuleta 
states, “Phased retirement offers an innovative alternative to tradi-
tional retirement for the twenty-first century workforce. It provides 
a new tool that allows managers to better provide unique mentoring 
opportunities for employees, while increasing access to the decades 
of institutional knowledge and experience that retirees can provide” 
(McGuinness 2014).6
RETURNING TO WORK AFTER RETIREMENT
An alternative to formal phased retirement programs is for older 
workers to return to their previous employers in a new role, often 
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after a period of nonemployment. When an employee is covered 
by a defined benefit plan, in most cases she will find that continued 
employment past normal retirement age carries a large opportunity 
cost. However, perhaps she (and her employer) would prefer to con-
tinue the relationship. IRS rules stipulate that an individual must sep-
arate from employment for a period of time and may return to work 
only in a position not covered by the pension from which the individ-
ual is actively receiving a benefit. Pension benefits can be suspended 
and covered work resumed at any point. Uncovered employment can 
typically be structured as contract work, whereby a worker is either 
self-employed or employed by an agency that leases their services 
to the career employer. This work could be flexible and part time or 
could be full time, but it must not be in a position that is covered by 
the defined benefit pension plan. An employer might value this type 
of arrangement since these contract-type positions likely do not carry 
the same job protections and restrictions. 
An alternative arrangement can be reached if a worker termi-
nates employment and requests a lump sum distribution of the 
defined benefit pension. In the private sector, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 guidelines stipulate that any plan 
that offers a lump sum option must calculate that amount using an 
actuarially equivalent formula. In the public sector, the lump sum 
option is generally calculated as the sum of employee contributions 
and is typically much lower than the present discounted value of the 
potential annuity for career workers (see the discussion in Clark, 
Morrill, and Vanderweide [2014]). In practice, it may be difficult for 
employers to navigate the complex tax rules associated with these 
work-after-retirement work-arounds. Maestas (2010, p. 726) writes, 
“Although the Pension Protection Act [2006] established the legality 
of in-service pension payments under certain circumstances, it is not 
yet clear to what extent employers will make this option available.” 
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EMPLOYER OPTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE  
DELAYED RETIREMENT
This chapter has highlighted several potential barriers to an 
employer accommodating workers’ desires to work longer. Age dis-
crimination laws may hinder an employer’s ability to adjust compen-
sation to reflect productivity changes as workers age. It might also be 
that conventions regarding wage growth inhibit an employers’ ability 
to adjust compensation downward. The typical structure of benefits 
may also be a problem. We speculate that employers may want to 
accommodate workers’ desires to work longer but might encounter 
legal or cultural obstacles along the way. This might explain why 
some workers transition to bridge jobs rather than enter phased retire-
ment at a career employer. 
As the workforce ages, we may see an increase in both phased 
retirement and return-to-work programs. This is particularly true 
among employers offering workers defined benefit plans, because 
these plans are designed to incentivize retirements at certain ages. If 
the employer seeks to retain talent at ages above their defined benefit 
plans’ normal retirement age, this can be achieved through the devel-
opment of programs that allow for a continued relationship while not 
violating IRS and federal and state regulations of pension plans.
Notes
1. Most defined benefit pension plans have an earnings-based formula that 
is the multiple of a generosity parameter, total years of service (earned 
plus purchased), and a final average salary (FAS) value, which is often 
based on the average salary during the individual’s final few years of 
service. If phased years are included in calculating FAS, monthly retire-
ment benefits will be lower. However, if phased retirees are not included 
in the retirement plan, then FAS would be based on prephased years (or 
the top few years of earnings, especially if the earnings were indexed) 
and the retirement benefit would be unaffected. 
2. Allowing phased retirees to begin to receive their pension benefits while 
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in phased retirement would mean that the retiree would be receiving the 
full retirement benefit along with the salary for phased retirement. 
3. Leslie and Janson (2005) also examine the value of phased retirement 
from the perspective of the university. 
4. Switkes (2005) describes the introduction of a phased retirement plan in 
the University of California system. 
5. Ghent, Allen, and Clark (2001) provide additional analysis of the intro-
duction of this phased retirement plan. Interestingly, they find that fac-
ulty who are enrolled in the state defined benefit plan are more likely 
to enter phased retirement than those who elected to participate in a 
defined contribution plan. This reflects two parameters of the program: 
1) the requirement that faculty retire before entering the plan, and 2) the 
stipulation that in phased retirement they will no longer accrue retire-
ment benefits. 
6. For detailed guidelines of the phased retirement program, see https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/08/08/2014-18681/phased 
-retirement (accessed December 2015).
Chapter 4
The Role of Public Policies
Federal policies on retirement and age discrimination influence 
workers’ decisions on whether to retire at later ages. These same 
policies affect employers’ willingness to retain older workers. This 
chapter reviews some of the key elements of national work and retire-
ment policies. Potential changes could remove some of the labor costs 
and legal constraints that limit employers’ willingness to retain older 
workers past traditional retirement ages. Labor market regulations 
that aim to protect older workers from age discrimination may hin-
der the ability of workers and firms to renegotiate contract terms that 
would make older workers more valuable. 
While individuals might want to work longer as life expectancy 
increases, the opportunities for continued employment depend on the 
actions of government and employers. The willingness of firms to 
retain individuals until older ages is affected by a series of public 
programs and policies. In this chapter, we consider possible changes 
in Social Security and Medicare, and we discuss age discrimination 
policies that directly affect the cost and benefit of modifying work-
ing conditions in a manner that will reduce the incentives that may 
prompt workers to retire.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE REFORMS TO 
PROMOTE DELAYED RETIREMENT 
Pay-as-you-go old age pensions or health insurance programs 
(e.g., Social Security and Medicare in the United States) require an 
adequate ratio of workers to claimants to remain solvent. Thus, gov-
ernments offering such programs must design public policies that 
incentivize shorter periods of time spent in retirement and longer 
periods of time spent paying into the systems. For example, Butrica, 
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Smith, and Steuerle (2006) estimate that the U.S. government would 
raise $180 billion in additional tax revenue by 2045 if all workers 
delayed retirement by one year. As the average age of the population 
rises and the cost of national entitlement programs increase, govern-
ment has attempted to encourage later retirement through higher ages 
of eligibility and lower benefits in such programs as Social Security.1 
Delayed retirement should reduce the cost of national retirement pro-
grams and help maintain per capita GDP in an aging society.2 Given 
the current financial plight of Social Security, it is likely that there 
will be fundamental changes in the payroll tax and benefit formula 
over the next two decades.3 
Fifty years ago, when Medicare was established, the average age 
of retirement was 65, which was the age of eligibility for both Medi-
care and Social Security. Significant increases in life expectancy since 
then have substantially increased the cost of these programs. Medi-
care faces a long-run financing deficit, and the trust fund is projected 
to be depleted in 2030.4 While the normal retirement age to qualify for 
Social Security benefits has increased to age 66, the age of eligibility 
for Medicare for the nondisabled has remained at 65. Increasing the 
age of eligibility for government health insurance should also encour-
age later retirement. 
If the government were to increase the ages of eligibility for 
Social Security and Medicare, how would employers respond? If a 
firm has designed an optimal compensation scheme to attract, retain, 
and retire workers, then firms might seek to offset changes in national 
retirement programs that encourage delayed retirement by adjust-
ing age-specific compensation (if allowed by law) or by increasing 
the retirement incentives in their own compensation packages. For 
example, if the normal retirement age of Social Security were raised 
to 70, employers could adjust their own retirement policies to tar-
get age 70 as the expected or normal retirement age. In other words, 
retirement plans could be restructured so that working to age 70 is 
necessary to provide an adequate retirement income. Of course, this 
implies that employers are willing to accept the higher retirement 
age. Interestingly, increases in the normal retirement ages specified 
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in pension plans would imply more years of work for employers and 
employees to accumulate sufficient resources to provide an adequate 
annual retirement income for the fewer number of years in retirement. 
An employer increasing the normal retirement age in its pension plan 
while holding the target replacement rate constant would moderate 
the higher cost of retaining older workers.
On the other hand, if employers have concerns about a higher 
retirement age for their workers, they could modify their own retire-
ment plans to offset the changes in Social Security so that work-
ers continue to retire at the age the company deems optimal. Such 
a response highlights the difference between worker preference for 
later retirement and job opportunities with firms concerned about the 
cost and productivity of older workers. Employers would be more 
willing to extend work life if compensation, costs, and working con-
ditions are altered (see Henkens and van Dalen [2011] and refer-
ences therein), which could reduce labor market rigidities that hinder 
employees from reducing hours worked or otherwise transitioning 
into retirement (Hurd 1996).  
Once Medicare was enacted, many employers agreed to extend 
health insurance to workers retiring by age 65. Retiree health insur-
ance can be considered an early retirement incentive—if retirees need 
to purchase health insurance until they are eligible for Medicare, this 
could be cost prohibitive, as the annual cost of health insurance for 
a married couple in their fifties or early sixties can be substantial. 
Employer-provided health insurance for retirees until they reach age 
65 can be an important incentive to retire prior to reaching age 65. 
Fitzpatrick (2014) shows how retiree health insurance for public 
school employees enhances the retirement incentives embedded in 
the defined benefit pension plan. The decline in coverage by defined 
benefit plans and the sharp drop in the proportion of firms providing 
retiree health insurance have altered the incentives for early retire-
ment. This is one of the reasons for the increase in labor force partici-
pation among older persons. Retiring after age 65 makes these plans 
less important to individuals as they plan the retirement transition.
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One policy change that would encourage individuals to continue 
working and employers to be more receptive to delayed retirement 
would be to eliminate Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes for 
both the employer and employee for all workers who have reached 
the age of eligibility for these programs. Such a change would 
acknowledge that these older workers had “paid up” their policies 
and were eligible for benefits. They would receive the equivalent of 
an increase in take-home pay of 7.65 percent, holding gross earn-
ings constant. This wage increase should further encourage delayed 
retirement. At the same time, the absolute and relative cost to the 
employer of maintaining older workers would decline by a similar 
amount. The elimination of employer payroll taxes on older work-
ers would increase the demand for these workers and likely result in 
more employment opportunities for older workers to remain in the 
labor force. Of course, the loss of this revenue would undermine the 
attempts to shore up these social insurance programs by encouraging 
later claiming ages.
PUBLIC POLICIES CONCERNING MODIFICATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
 The evidence indicates that many workers prefer a gradual tran-
sition into retirement. Currently, the most frequent method of achiev-
ing this shift in employment status is to retire from a career employer 
and move to a bridge job. In general, the hourly wage in bridge jobs is 
much lower than compensation in the old job. Would it be more effi-
cient for workers to negotiate new working conditions and compen-
sation with their career employer rather than incur search costs and 
move to lower-paying employment? Earlier, we showed that employ-
ers may be reluctant to adopt phased retirement or return-to-work 
programs. They may fear being sued for age discrimination if wages 
and status are reduced. In addition, defined benefit pension regula-
tions may inhibit individuals from working while claiming benefits. 
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Employers would also be more likely to enact phased retirement or 
return-to-work policies if the offer of continued employment can be 
restricted to targeted workers, such as those in hard-to-replace jobs or 
only workers with high levels of performance. 
More work is needed to determine whether state and federal poli-
cies, such as age discrimination rules, affect end-of-career decisions 
by both firms and workers. Certain types of employment and compen-
sation restructuring toward the end of careers clearly would be in the 
interest of at least some workers and firms. The reluctance of employ-
ers to adopt these policies is due in part to uncertainty about how they 
will be viewed by regulators and the courts. Removing this concern 
should increase the incidence of phased retirement programs through-
out the economy, although potentially at the cost of removing needed 
employment protections for older workers. In addition, even if poli-
cies were modified, it would certainly not be the case that all firms 
move quickly to adopt phased retirement programs. As highlighted 
in Chapter 2, real cost and productivity issues would likely remain. 
If offered the choice, would individuals prefer redefined employ-
ment with their career employer to a new job? The answer to this 
question depends on the preferences of workers and the types of new 
working conditions they might prefer in the final working years. 
Those who are seeking new challenges and second careers may still 
want to shift to new occupations in different industries; however, for 
many, it is likely that reduced search costs and a familiar working 
environment will be the optimal path for the transition into retirement.
IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICIES ON EMPLOYERS, AND 
THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT DELAYED RETIREMENT
National economic policies can influence the rate of growth of 
the economy and hence the aggregate demand for labor. A faster rate 
of growth leads to greater increases in the demand for workers. In a 
growing economy, hiring new workers becomes more difficult, and 
54   Clark and Morrill
firms will be more willing to retain older workers and allow the aver-
age age of retirement to rise. Alternatively, a more slowly growing 
economy creates an environment in which firms seek to encourage 
older workers to leave at earlier ages. Thus, macroeconomic policies 
that promote growth are consistent with delayed retirement.
Some policies, programs, and regulations directly affect the cost 
of hiring and retaining workers. To the extent that these policies 
increase the cost of employing older rather than younger workers, 
employers will resist extending the work life of their career employ-
ees. With an increase in average life expectancy, the need for delayed 
retirement becomes more important. A comprehensive assessment 
is needed of the impact of these various programs on the demand 
for older workers and whether policies raise hurdles as firms seek to 
respond to their employees’ desire for later retirement and modified 
working conditions in their final working years. The history of firm 
compensation policy indicates that employers do respond to changes 
in government policies that affect costs. Policies that reduce the rela-
tive cost of employing older workers or that remove constraints that 
limit modifications of working conditions should increase opportuni-
ties for older workers to remain in their career jobs.
Notes
1. Changes have included those made by the 1983 Greenspan Commission, 
which raised the age for full benefits, instituted changes in the earnings 
test, and delayed retirement credits (Schieber and Shoven 1999). 
2. Clark et al. (2008) illustrate the impact of delayed retirement and higher 
labor force participation rates for older men and women on the future 
growth rate of the Japanese economy. 
3. The annual report of the Social Security Trustees (2014) indicates that 
the projected 75-year deficit of the OASDI program is 2.88 percent of 
taxable earnings and that the OASDI trust fund will be exhausted in 
2033.
4. See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (accessed 
August 24, 2016).
Chapter 5
The Future of Working Longer
Any assessment of labor market trends must include a careful analy-
sis of employer interests associated with the size and age distribution of 
their workforces. Over the past 50 years, firms have dramatically altered 
their compensation policies in response to changing government poli-
cies and labor market conditions. The development of defined benefit 
pension plans, increases in these plans’ generosity, and the adoption of 
early retirement incentives allowed employers to achieve an orderly 
retirement around the desired ages of retirement. The introduction of 
retiree health insurance programs following the enactment of Medicare 
also provided incentives for many individuals to retire prior to age 65, 
when they would become eligible for Medicare. 
Many of these changes were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when baby boomers began entering the labor force. In response to the 
increased supply of younger, cheaper, and better-educated workers, 
firms adopted new retirement policies that offered older workers the 
opportunity to retire. An aging population and rising life expectancy, 
along with modifications in government policies and programs, sub-
stantially increased the cost to employers of providing these benefits. 
Firms have responded by shifting from defined benefit retirement 
plans to defined contribution plans, which lack the same early retire-
ment incentives. The sharp decline in coverage by retiree health plans 
has made early retirement more expensive for workers. Thus, these 
changes in employers’ policies have exacerbated the need for older 
workers to remain in the labor force. The key question for the future 
is, how will employers respond to the increasing desire of workers to 
remain on the job past age 65? 
MODIFYING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS TO  
ACCOMMODATE DELAYED RETIREMENT 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, labor force participa-
tion rates of older individuals steadily declined. In order to finance a 
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retirement of 10 or 15 years, individuals must save throughout their 
working years. The establishment of Social Security in 1935 prom-
ised workers a base income for retirement and thus helped individuals 
accumulate sufficient income for retirement. In the post–World War 
II period, employers began offering pension plans that provide addi-
tional retirement income. As these plans spread across the economy, 
employers developed pensions that provided significant incentives 
for workers to retire at or before age 65. The phenomenon of employ-
ers encouraging retirement at relatively young ages was the result of a 
rapidly growing population that enabled firms to hire younger workers 
at lower wages. Rising educational attainment and the emergence of 
new technologies reduced the competitive advantage of experience. 
Thus, changing economic and demographic conditions provided the 
impetus for employers to develop employment and compensation 
policies that encouraged retirement at specific ages. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, individuals began to reassess early 
retirement, and the labor force participation rates rose for men and 
women aged 55 and over. This reversal of the trend toward early 
retirement was influenced by changes in Social Security policies, the 
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, and increased 
life expectancy. As workers seek to delay retirement, firms must 
review their policies and determine whether they will accommodate 
later retirements or develop new programs that achieve the desired 
retirement ages of their employees.
This analysis began with the premise that, compared to workers 
in the twentieth century, individuals today want to remain in the labor 
force until older ages. Economists and policy analysts have noted the 
difficulties of accumulating sufficient resources to finance greater 
longevity. The annual saving rates needed to achieve a desired stan-
dard of living in retirement are higher when the expected length of 
retirement is 25 or 30 years compared to 15 or 20 years. Changes in 
Social Security and low interest rates imply that delaying the claim-
ing of Social Security benefits results in present value gains, which 
provide insurance against living to very old ages. As a result, extend-
ing work life has become a rallying cry in the popular press and in 
research studies.
Analyses of delayed retirement generally focus on the workers’ 
perspective—rarely do studies consider the impact of delayed retire-
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ment on employers. In this book, we ask whether employers will 
be willing and able to accommodate workers’ preferences to retire 
later. Workers’ retirement decisions will ultimately depend on life-
time compensation, employers’ human resource policies, and govern-
ment policies and programs. While labor supply changes associated 
with increased work life have received considerable attention in the 
literature, much less is understood about potential changes in labor 
demand. 
Throughout this book, we have analyzed the employer perspec-
tive of the evolving paths to retirement. For many individuals, the 
norm is no longer for workers to move directly from full-time work 
to complete retirement. Instead, many move to new jobs, seeking 
reduced hours, new challenges, or less stressful environments. They 
are able to continue working, potentially at lower annual earnings 
because they can draw on Social Security, employer pensions, and 
other savings. Some retirees move into self-employment and enjoy 
the ability to manage their own time. These transitions may occur at 
the time of retirement from one’s career job or after a period of no 
work. Employers must then determine whether to hire or retain this 
growing segment of the labor force.
It is interesting to consider the different challenges facing career 
employers whose employees defer retirement as opposed to firms that 
hire workers in this postretirement market. A key question for both 
types of employers is, can employment and compensation policies 
be offered in which the value of older workers is sufficiently high 
relative to their costs? Of course, these working conditions must also 
meet the preferences of workers attempting to delay retirement. An 
important issue for future research is whether individuals are better 
off switching jobs or attempting to work with career employers to 
achieve appropriate employment terms.
CAREER EMPLOYER CONCERNS WITH  
DELAYED RETIREMENT
When career employees delay retirement, the most important 
issue for employers is the impact of an aging labor force on produc-
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tivity and labor costs. Many employers believe that after some point 
productivity begins to decline. Hourly, or even annual, productivity 
is hard to measure in many jobs. While some studies have tried to 
capture the path of productivity over a career, these measures tend to 
be noisy and unreliable. It is certainly true that gains and declines in 
productivity will vary substantially across workers. These individual 
differences around general age patterns of productivity provide a 
rationale for age discrimination laws. These laws were often adopted 
in response to concerns that firms were limiting the opportunities of 
workers in the second half of their careers, when they were aged 40 
and older. These same laws might now prevent employers from alter-
ing employment conditions that would make the retention of older 
workers more desirable.
While productivity may be difficult to measure, earnings are 
more easily observable. The literature contains many studies estimat-
ing age-earnings profiles. Administrative data clearly show a rise in 
annual earnings with job tenure. Most economic studies have focused 
exclusively on earnings as a measure of labor costs. Chapter 2 shows 
that the cost of employee benefits—especially health insurance, 
pension contributions, and paid time off—also increases with age. 
Economic theory indicates that when a worker’s marginal produc-
tivity falls below the marginal cost of his employment to the firm, 
then a profit-maximizing firm would like for this employee to retire. 
Employers have developed personnel policies and compensation sys-
tems to create incentives to retire around certain ages.
Profit-maximizing firms must determine the optimal number of 
workers to be employed and also the appropriate mix of individuals 
at different ages. Pay scales and benefits help the firm first attract the 
desired labor force and then retain those workers. Policies are also 
developed to give employees incentives to retire when it is optimal 
for the employer. If workers do not retire around these ages, the firm 
will be adversely affected. Delayed retirement by older workers will 
limit the promotion prospects of younger workers and reduce the abil-
ity of the firm to hire new employees.
The preference for an orderly retirement of employees around 
specific ages does not imply that older workers have no value. Rather, 
it follows from an assessment that their productivity has fallen below 
cost. Workers make retirement decisions based on their own prefer-
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ences and resources in an effort to maximize utility over their remain-
ing years. With increases in life expectancy and reductions in public 
and private retirement benefits, it is easy to see why career employ-
ees may want to retire at older ages, given current compensation and 
workloads. 
EMPLOYER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
If we assume that the desire for extended work life will continue 
to rise, we must then consider how employers will respond. The deci-
sions of workers to remain on the job may not be optimal for the 
employer. In addition, employers may seek to develop compensation 
policies that take advantage of an older workforce that may desire 
fewer hours and lower levels of benefits but may also have higher lev-
els of experience and job-specific knowledge. Employers might find 
that, all else equal, it is optimal to accommodate workers’ preferences 
for working longer by modifying job assignments and compensation 
policies. However, they may also face barriers to making adjustments 
to working conditions and compensation. Such barriers may include 
union contracts, age discrimination laws, pension regulations, and 
production techniques. Workers might consider remaining with their 
employers for lower compensation if they could work fewer hours 
and have less responsibility. 
Phased retirement and return-to-work policies might fit both 
worker preferences and employer concerns. The use of these poli-
cies in today’s economy is somewhat limited, despite the fact that 
many workers might prefer restructured compensation while remain-
ing with their current employers rather than retiring and seeking new 
employment in a bridge job. Employers may have informal policies 
that aim to keep the best workers but may be reluctant to have a broad 
program that offers phased retirement to all qualified employees. This 
may be due to the difficulties of developing cost-neutral policies and 
production techniques that work better with full-time employees. 
Employers also seem reluctant to adopt such policies for fear that 
they might run afoul of federal and state age discrimination policies.
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Given current trends and public policies, it seems likely that firms 
will be faced with increasing demand by employees to delay retire-
ment. New research is needed to provide a better framework in which 
to evaluate the impact of this expected change on labor costs and pro-
ductivity. For example, would individuals actually prefer a decreas-
ing wage profile at the end of a career prior to complete retirement? 
Would this type of contract be more appealing if framed as a lifetime 
compensation package rather than a decline in salary at the end of 
career? The presence of bridge jobs suggests that lower wages and 
fewer hours are appealing to some older workers. 
Do workers prefer bridge jobs to a “tapering” contract because 
it avoids the feelings of loss? The behavioral economics literature 
has addressed how intertemporal choice and time discounting affects 
individuals’ preferences regarding when in their careers they receive 
the highest levels of compensation (e.g., Loewenstein and Sicherman 
[1991]). One explanation offered for why we do not observe decreas-
ing wage profiles at older ages is that individuals might experience 
“loss aversion” when their salaries are lowered (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). A useful research agenda would combine insights 
from behavioral economics with a consideration of how best to con-
struct optimal employment contracts that would extend the work life 
of workers. The employer may gain from a contract that includes 
tapering as a cost-effective means of maintaining firm-specific human 
capital, while the worker might benefit from a contract that avoids the 
perception of a loss. 
In the longer term, if employers accommodate longer work lives 
for employees, does this lead to new types of employment contracts? 
For example, if phased retirement becomes a normative arrangement, 
then we might expect adjustments in employment contracts that pre-
commit workers to lower salaries and/or benefits at older ages. Do 
employers find it more efficient to set up formal policies regarding 
retirement transitions, such as phased retirement options or return to 
work postretirement? If so, are tax policies and government-provided 
retirement benefits designed optimally to allow for new types of 
employment relationships? What new types of employment contracts 
are currently being introduced to accommodate trends toward work-
ing longer? 
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IMPACT OF POTENTIAL CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY
If working longer is deemed to be beneficial for individuals, 
society, and the economy, government policies could be adopted to 
increase incentives for individuals to remain in the labor force and 
for firms to employ older workers. Identifying and removing any real 
or perceived age discrimination issues associated with phased retire-
ment programs would encourage firms to adopt such plans. Firms 
could then consider modifying working conditions and compensation 
policies in order to increase the probability that older workers are 
cost effective. Redesigned jobs and reduced working hours combined 
with access to retirement benefits when entering phased retirement 
could make employees more willing to leave full-time employment 
and accept these new conditions. Such redesigned jobs may well be 
more appealing to individuals wishing to prolong their work lives 
than entering the bridge job market. In Chapter 3, we examine how 
phased retirement policies are widespread in higher education and are 
generally viewed as a win-win for faculty and institutions.
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND LABOR  
MARKET RESPONSES
Market wage rates are determined by demand for and supply of 
workers. Population aging and the increase in the proportion of the 
65-and-older population who want to remain in the labor force should 
result in downward pressure on the market wage for these workers. 
In particular, we would expect that wages of older workers would 
decline, which should increase employment opportunities for older 
workers. A more slowly growing population implies smaller entering 
cohorts. Thus, as firms find that hiring younger workers is more dif-
ficult and costly, the demand for older workers might increase.
Much of the analysis in this book has focused on the impact of 
delayed retirement on individual employers, holding constant market 
forces. In many respects, this is how a firm would view these changes. 
However, demographic changes and any ensuing macroeconomic 
shifts will alter the labor market over time in fundamental ways not 
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discussed in this book. For example, downward pressure on market 
wages will increase the willingness of firms to accommodate prefer-
ences for older retirement ages. 
We have outlined how individual employers might view a sudden 
change in the retirement ages of its current workforce, and we empha-
size how the push toward delayed retirement might not be desirable 
to individual employers. We speculate that as individuals choose 
to delay retirement, firms will respond by developing new types of 
employment contracts more suited to the preferences of older workers 
and consistent with their changing value to firms. 
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